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1 Introduction 
Since 2007, the world has witnessed one of the most severe economic 
downturns in recent history. By October 2008, the situation has gotten so 
precarious that the Austrian government deemed it necessary to introduce a 
stabilization scheme for financial markets.  Among other instruments, this 
scheme allowed the minister of finance to improve certain banks’ equity 
ratios by providing equity-like capital, so called participation capital: 
Similar to preferred stock, holders of such securities participate in a firm’s 
losses, but receive a preferred dividend if the bank generates profits. In 
order to avoid competitive distortions in the financial markets, the European 
Commission stipulated a rather pricey preferred dividend of about 9.3 
percent p.a. for state-issued capital. However, if a bank managed to raise at 
least 30 percent of the new funds from private parties – under equal 
conditions as the state –, the state’s dividend would be adjusted to the 
market rate. 
 This clause of the stabilization scheme created an interesting 
situation: As the pecking order theory of the capital structure suggests, 
banks should be reluctant to issue equity, as it carries high adverse selection 
costs. Only banks in financial distress would be expected to issue equity-
like securities such as participation certificates. However, with the provision 
in place that banks receive a discount on participation capital previously 
raised from the state, which is contingent solely on the fact that they issue 
certificates to private investors, some of the adverse selection costs should 
be covered by the discount. Thus, the costs associated with asymmetric 
information are somewhat mitigated and not only the worst of the pack, but 
also better banks would be able to raise additional capital profitably. 
The purpose of this thesis is to illustrate this effect of the stabilization 
scheme. This is done in three parts: Part one presents the pecking order 
theory of the capital structure as proposed by Myers (1984) and Myers and 
Majluf (1984). Empirical studies on said theory will also be presented, as 
well as models that extend the standard pecking order model. Part two 
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explores the events surrounding the introduction of the Austrian financial 
market stabilization scheme and presents the terms relevant to the subject at 
hand. Part three presents a numerical example that highlights the effect 
described above.  
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2 The Pecking Order Theory of the Capital 
Structure 
2.1 The Standard Pecking Order Theory 
2.1.1 Importance within Capital Structure Theory 
Capital structure theories seek to explain the market forces that determine 
the relative proportion of securities – equity, debt and hybrid capital – 
employed to finance a company’s assets and operations, or – conversely – 
how changes in the capital structure influence a company’s value.  
 Modern capital structure theories are based on the fundamental 
theorem put forward by Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller in 1958, 
which stated that the capital structure is irrelevant in the absence of „market 
frictions“: e.g. taxes, bankruptcy costs, transaction costs, agency costs, or 
asymmetric information. (Modigliani & Miller, 1958) This insight provided 
a starting point for capital structure theories, as it suggests possible factors 
that could give a reason why financing decisions do matter. Broadly 
speaking, two competing theories regarding the capital structure of a firm 
have been proposed: the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory 
(Fama & French, 2002). Trade-off theories establish an optimum 
debt/equity ratio: firms seek to maximize firm value by balancing the costs 
and benefits of either financing instrument. These costs and benefits occur 
due to the market frictions.  The pecking-order theory on the other hand 
does not imply an optimum in the capital structure, as internal equity is 
preferred to debt but debt is preferred to external equity. Rather, “changes in 
debt ratios are driven by the need for external funds, not by an attempt to 
reach an optimal capital structure.” (Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999) 
As Miller (1977) noted in address to the American Finance 
Association, which later was published as “Debt and Taxes”, the prevalent 
theory of the capital structure – following the publication of the 1958 
Modigliani-Miller paper – was the static trade-off model between tax-
benefits of debt financing and bankruptcy costs associated with debt: this 
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model predicts that companies seek to find an optimum between minimizing 
the costs of taxes, which decrease with an increasing debt level (as interest 
payments decrease profits), and expected bankruptcy costs, which increase 
with an increasing debt level (as the risk that a company will not be able to 
service its interest payments increases). In the same address, Miller heavily 
criticized said theory by comparing the costs of taxes and bankruptcy to a 
horse and rabbit stew – one horse to one rabbit. According to him, if the 
trade-off model were correct, debt levels should be much higher than they 
actually were, as taxes yielded high costs, especially in relation to the 
relatively miniscule expected bankruptcy costs. 
 Six years later, also in an address to the American Finance 
Association later published as “The Capital Structure Puzzle” (1984), Myers 
criticized the trade-off model on similar grounds as Miller and subsequently 
proposed his solution to the capital structure problem: the pecking order 
theory. His model was inspired by a set of stylized empirical facts, which 
suggested the following trends in a firm’s capital structure choices: 
1. Firms prefer internal finance. 
2. They adapt their target dividend payout ratio to their investment opportunities, 
although dividends are sticky and target payout ratios are only gradually 
adjusted to shifts in the extent of valuable investment opportunities. 
3. Sticky dividend policies, plus unpredictable fluctuations in profitability and 
investment opportunities, mean that internally-generated cash flow may be more 
or less than investment outlays. If it is less, the firm first draws down its cash 
balance or marketable securities portfolio. If it is more, the firm first pays off 
debt or invests in cash or marketable securities. If the surplus persists, it may 
gradually increase its target payout ratio. 
4. If external finance is required, firms issue the safest security first. That is, they 
start with debt, then possibly hybrid securities such as convertible bonds, then 
perhaps equity as a last resort. In this story, there is no well-defined target debt-
equity mix, because there are two kinds of equity, internal and external, one at 
the top of the pecking order and one at the bottom. Each firm’s observed debt 
ratio reflects its cumulative requirements for external finance. (Myers, 
1984, p. 581) 
These findings were not new at that point but lacked a theoretical 
foundation. Together with Majluf, Myers presented a paper that explained 
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these stylized facts by considering costs incurred through asymmetric 
information. 
2.1.2 The Model 
The costs of asymmetric information were most notably explained by 
Akerlof’s paper „The Market for Lemons“.(Akerlof, 1970) Akerlof gave the 
example of the used car market, where the sellers knew whether the car they 
were trying to sell was good or bad (a lemon), while buyers only knew the 
probability that any randomly chosen car was good or bad. A rational buyer 
– knowing that the car he was considering was a lemon with a probability 
greater than zero – would not be willing to pay the price of a good car. 
Thus, owners of good cars would not be willing to sell at all. To give a 
numerical example, we might posit that good cars are worth 100 while 
lemons are worth 50. If we assume that any given car might be good or bad 
with equal probability, a rational agent would be willing to pay 50% * 100 + 
50% * 50 = 75, even less if he is risk averse. Owners of a car worth 100 
would not be willing to sell for 75, while owners of lemons would be more 
than willing to sell for 75. Thus, by merely offering her good car for 75, a 
person would signal that it was in fact a bad one; if we assume that no 
person would sell her car below the “real” value, only bad cars would be 
sold. As rational buyers anticipate this, all cars that are put up for sale would 
be priced at 50. 
 Myers and Majluf (1984) applied this phenomenon to the assets of a 
firm and developed a three period model: A company that already has an 
asset in place has a valuable investment opportunity. This investment 
opportunity cannot be postponed, i.e. if the company does not invest at t=0, 
the opportunity disappears. The company also is not able to finance a share 
of the investment only. Management acts in the interest of the old 
shareholders and all or parts of the project would have to be financed by 
issuing additional equity to new shareholders. When asymmetric 
information is ignored, the company would always issue and invest, as its 
net present value (NPV) is positive. However, as issuing equity sends a 
negative signal about the asset in place and the investment opportunity new 
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equity will be underpriced. Thus, the company might pass up on the 
investment if the discount on equity the old shareholders have to give the 
new shareholders in order to successfully raise the required amount exceeds 
the value of the investment that belongs to the old shareholders. 
 To summarize, the model is based on the following assumptions:  
1. At t = -1 information between management and investors is 
symmetric. At t = 0 management receives additional information. At 
t = 1, this information becomes public. Investors are aware of the 
information asymmetry. Conveying information would be costly. 
2. The firm has an existing asset in place. Its value at t = -1 is the 
expected future value Ã = E(Ã). At t = 0, management learns about 
the realization of Ã, a. At t = 1, a becomes public knowledge. 
3. In addition to its asset the firm has financial slack S on hand, which 
includes cash, marketable securities and tolerance for risk-free debt. 
The amount of slack available to the firm is public knowledge. 
4. The company has an investment opportunity with a positive net 
present value, which cannot be deferred and cannot be taken 
partially. It requires an investment of I, where I > S, i.e. investing in 
the project requires issuing equity of E = I - S. At t = -1, the publicly 
known net present value of this investment opportunity is E( ). At t 
= 0, management learns about the realized value of , b. At t = 1 
this information becomes public. 
5. Neither a nor b can be negative. The asset in place is non-negative 
due to limited liability. b cannot be negative because otherwise it is 
discarded.  
6. The market prices all public information efficiently, i.e. prices are 
formed based on expected future values. Investors are assumed to be 
risk neutral. Future values are not discounted for the time value of 
money in this model, as this would not change the results 
significantly.  
7. Issuing equity (or other securities) does not produce transaction 
costs. 
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8. Management acts in the interest of existing shareholders. 
9. Shareholders are assumed to be passive, i.e. they do not buy or sell 
at t=0. If equity is issued, they do not increase their holdings, i.e. the 
newly issued equity is bought by new investors. 
Myers and Majluf summarized their model’s distribution of information 
with respect to time in the following table:  
 
 
 Date t=-1 t=0 t=1 
Management 
Distribution 
of Ã, ; S 
a, b; S a, b; St1 or 0 
Information 
available to: 
Market 
Distribution 
of Ã, ; S 
Distribution 
of Ã, ; S; 
E=0 or E=I-S 
a, b; St1 or 0 
 
Information is symmetric in the periods t=-1 and t=1. In between, investors 
know less than management. However, they are aware of this asymmetry 
and can observe whether stock is issued. Thus, management’s issuing 
decision acts as a signal.  
 To exemplify the mechanism behind their model, Myers and Majluf 
give the following numerical example: A company might be in good or bad 
shape, with equal probability. If they are in good shape, their asset a is 
worth 150 and their investment opportunity b has a net present value of 20. 
If they are in bad shape their asset a is worth 50 and their investment 
opportunity b has a NPV of 10. They have no financial slack, i.e. S=0, and 
the investment opportunity requires 100, i.e. I = E = 100. Let P denote the 
market capitalization of a company if it does not issue stock, P* if it does.  
The two possible states of a company can be summarized as follows: 
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State of the company good bad 
Asset in place a 150 50 
Investment opportunity (NPV) b 20 10 
 
Following the logic that a company should invest in any project that has a 
positive NPV, any company – good or bad – should issue and invest, as the 
investment opportunity has a positive NPV in either state. If all companies 
did follow this strategy, the results would be as follows: Both kinds of 
company would be priced at  
P* = Ã +  = 50% * (150 + 50) + 50% * (20 + 10) = 115 . 
At t=0, the actual value of the firm, which only management is 
aware of, is V= a + b + E = 270 for good firms and V=160 for bad firms. 
The market value, which is the same for both companies, as the market 
cannot differentiate between them, is MV = P* + E = 115 + 100 = 215. 
After an issue, the old shareholders own P*/MV while the new 
shareholders own E/MV. Thus, if all companies issue and invest, the actual 
value distribution at t=0 and t=1 between old and new shareholders would 
be as follows: 
State of the company good bad 
Old shareholders 144.42 85.58 
New shareholders 125.58 74.42 
Total 270 160 
 
Considering that the new equity is issued at 100, we see immediately 
that buying equity of a good firm gives new shareholders an additional 
25.58 at the expense of old shareholders, while new shareholders of a bad 
company overpay by 25.58, which benefits the old shareholders. Yet, 
knowing this, would management acting in the interest of old shareholders 
actually issue equity? From the old shareholders point of view, which we 
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assume is the one that matters to management, a payoff table would look 
like this: 
State of the company good bad 
… issues equity 144.42 85.58 Payoff to old investors if 
the firm … … does not issue equity 150 60 
 
It is immediately obvious that old shareholders of a good company would be 
better off if management did not issue equity. Thus, management would not 
issue additional equity and pass up the investment opportunity. With the 
market being aware of this reasoning, an equity issue would become a 
signal for a company being in a bad state. Thus, the existing equity of 
issuing companies would be correctly priced at 60 while the equity of non-
issuing companies would be priced at 150.  
 It would be clear ex ante that good companies pass up on their 
investment opportunities. At t=-1, the equilibrium market price would be Pe 
= Ã + 50% bbad = 50% * (150 + 50) + 50% 10 = 105. 10 are lost because the 
market is aware that good investment opportunities will be passed up. 
 The extent to which asymmetric information impacts the issuing 
decision obviously depends on the relative values of the asset and the 
investment opportunity in the various states. It is conceivable that the 
relative difference between a good and a bad company is small enough that 
both companies would issue stock in equilibrium. The same result might 
occur if the investment opportunity’s value is big enough relative to the 
value of the existing assets: Not issuing equity, i.e. passing on the 
investment opportunity, would be more costly than the costs associated with 
asymmetric information. Generally speaking, the crucial factors in the 
management’s issuing decision are the difference between the value of 
outstanding equity at t=0 E0 (when the issuing decision is made) and of old 
equity at t=1 E1 (when investors learn about the real value of the firm) in 
relation to . Management will issue and invest if E1 - E0 = !E < . 
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 Information asymmetries directly explain why companies would be 
inclined to keep financial slack: In the example given, management would 
want to have slack of S=100, as this would let them finance the project 
without bearing any signaling costs by issuing equity. Thus, with enough 
slack at hand to finance the project, the value of the firm at t=-1 increases to 
115, as all positive NPV projects can be undertaken without issuing equity. 
 What the model cannot explain entirely is the role of risky debt and 
dividend policies. If we relax the assumption that equity has to be issued in 
order to proceed with the project and also allow for other securities, we see 
that management will also issue and invest if D1-D0 = !D < . However, as 
Myers and Majluf explain, option-pricing theory predicts that while !D and 
!E will share the same sign (i.e. just like equity, risky debt will be 
overvalued and vice versa), the absolute value of !D will always be lower 
than that of !E. More intuitively, the preference for debt is apparent if one 
considers that debt constitutes a claim to a fixed amount that is senior to 
claims of equity, i.e. if a debt investor is wrong about the value of a firm 
due to asymmetric information, her mistake will be less costly than with 
equity. This implies, however, that within the framework of the model, 
firms would always prefer debt to equity (if they decide to issue any 
security at all), i.e. firms would never issue equity at all. Information 
asymmetries regarding the value of a company alone cannot explain equity 
issuance. Explaining this requires a boundary for debt other than 
asymmetric information about the value of the firm (such as agency costs – 
as proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Alternatively, Myers (1984, p. 
FN 13) and Myers and Majluf (1984, p. 32) refer to Giammarino and Neave 
(1982) who proposed a model where asymmetric information exists with 
regard to the company’s risk instead of the company’s value. In such cases, 
they argue, the pecking order is reversed, i.e. equity dominates debt. Halov 
and Heider (2004) pursued this intuition and found evidence that 
asymmetric information about risk might function as a boundary for issuing 
debt (see 2.3 below). 
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2.2 Empirical Evidence 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) criticized existing empirical work on 
capital structure theories: While studies usually confirm static trade-off 
theories, they posited that they would not return negative results even if 
other factors, such as those predicted by the pecking order theory, were 
actually driving financing decisions, i.e. “the static trade-off hypothesis will 
appear to work when financing follows the pecking order.” (Shyam-Sunder 
& Myers, 1999, p. 221) Thus, they propose a test that would be able to 
reject the pecking order theory: First, they define the “funds flow deficit”, 
which is given as 
 DEFt = DIVt + Xt + !Wt + Rt - Ct  
where 
• Ct = operating cash flows, after interest and taxes,  
• DIVt = dividend payments, 
• Xt = capital expenditures, 
• !Wt = net increase in working capital, 
• Rt = current portion of long-term debt at start of period, 
• !Dt = debt issued/retired. 
In order to support the pecking order hypothesis, testing 
 !Dit = a + bPODEFit + eit 
should produce a = 0 and bPO = 1.  Running the regression on a sample of 
157 continuously reporting, mature firms from 1971 to 1989 returns a 
coefficient of 0.72 (R2 = 0.72 (Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999, p. 238), 
lending support to the pecking order theory as a first-order approximation. 
Frank and Goyal  (2003, p. 218) commented that this result was “attractive 
and influential,” while Halov and Heider (2004, p. 1) objected, “[…] these 
firms should face little asymmetric information in capital markets.” 
 Using the same testing model as Shyam-Sunder and Myers, Frank 
and Goyal (2003) tried to replicate the results on a broader sample. Running 
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the test on a sample of 768 continuously reporting firms during the same 
timeframe as Shyam-Sunder and Myers, they manage to reproduce the 
results with a coefficient of 0.75 (R2 = 0.71). However, Frank and Goyal 
note that while the pecking order theory does not actually require a balanced 
panel for its test, considering continuously reporting firms only produces a 
bias towards larger firms, whose “book value of assets is almost twice that 
of the broader population of firms. These firms also issue significantly 
higher amounts of debt and significantly lower amounts of equity.” (Frank 
& Goyal, 2003, p. 233) Running a regression on the whole, unbalanced 
panel produces a coefficient of only 0.28 (R2 = 0.14). Using data from 
another time-period (1990-1998) produces low coefficients as well, for 
balanced panels (0.33) as well as unbalanced ones (0.15). When grouping 
firms for size, smaller firms returned significantly lower coefficients (0.17 
from 1971-1989, 0.09 from 1990-1998) than medium (0.43/0.16) or large 
firms (0.75/0.68). This is a bad result for the standard pecking order model, 
as asymmetric information is usually expected to be indirectly related to 
firm size, i.e. small firm’s equity should be more affected by adverse 
selection costs and thus be more likely to issue equity. The same intuition 
can be applied to high growth firms, who returned equally surprising results 
with a coefficient of only 0.13. Frank and Goyal concluded, “many aspects 
of the evidence posed serious problems for the pecking order.” (Frank & 
Goyal, 2003, p. 241) 
 Helwege and Liang (1996) find similar problems when testing 
young firms for pecking order behavior. They compiled a sample of 367 
firms that completed an IPO in 1983 and analyzed their financing behavior 
between 1984 and 1992. Tracking firms after they completed an IPO 
appears to have the following advantages:  
• Growth is fast while free cash flows are small. Thus, if the pecking 
order is correct, firms are more likely to acquire outside capital, 
which produces more opportunities for testing. 
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• Firms are less likely to issue risk-free or low-risk debt, as their cash 
flows are very small and/or risky. This makes the advantages of debt 
over equity less severe, according to pecking order theory.  
• Firms should exhibit larger information asymmetries due to their 
short track record. 
Helwege and Liang test two predictions of the pecking order theory, using a 
logit model and a multinomial logit model respectively: First they tested the 
negative relationship between changes in internal funds and external 
financing predicted by the pecking order model. The second test analyzes 
the financing choice given external financing: Given a choice between 
public debt, private debt and equity, firms are assumed to move up in the 
pecking order hierarchy with increasing risk and down the hierarchy with 
increasing asymmetric information. A third test is undertaken where the 
decision to raise funds and the choice between different securities is not 
independent: here they use a “multinomial logit with four nodes:  issue 
public debt, issue private debt, issue equity, or do not issue any securities. 
The variables affecting the decision to obtain external funds (e.g. the deficit) 
and those affecting the type of security (risk and asymmetric information 
variables) are combined in this multinomial logit estimation.”(Helwege & 
Liang, 1996, p. 439) In all their tests, Helwege and Liang find little support 
for the pecking order theory: A projected increase in the financing deficit 
did not seem to drive the decision to acquire external financing. Also, the 
financing decision did not correspond well to the pecking order theory’s 
predictions: “The most common source of external financing was private 
debt, but private debt offerings declined over the period. Firms that issued 
public bonds and public equity, however, were the fastest growing, most 
profitable firms.”(Helwege & Liang, 1996, p. 456) 
 Fama and French (2002) directly compare predictions of the trade-
off and the pecking order model regarding dividend policies and debt levels 
by running regression tests. Fama and French maintain that the pecking 
order model beats the trade-off model with regards to their predictions about 
debt levels: Profitable firms were found to have lower debt levels (contrary 
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to the predictions of the trade-off model, where firms are assumed to use 
leverage as tax shields). However, they also point out one important 
anomalous finding in their tests: Like Frank and Goyal, they find that 
smaller firms are usually less levered and that the “least-levered [firms] 
make large net new issues of stock […], even tough they appear to have 
low-risk debt capacity. This is not proper pecking order behavior.” (Fama & 
French, 2002, p. 28) 
 Thus, empirical evidence is mixed at best for the standard pecking 
order theory. Extensions of the standard model have been brought forward 
to alleviate or explain some anomalies in the empirical results. 
2.3 Extensions to the Model 
Myers and Majluf’s standard pecking order model has been extended in 
order to relax some implicit or explicit unrealistic assumptions. Some 
models support the standard pecking order, while others come up with 
different results to varying degrees. To give an overview, the following 
models, which are either similar to or based on Myers and Majluf’s model, 
will be presented: 
a. Korajczyk et. al. (1992) add a dynamic component to the degree of 
asymmetric information as well as the value of the project. 
Accordingly, a company can time their equity issue in order to 
minimize asymmetric information costs. 
b. Krasker (1986) relaxes the assumption that the investment project is 
“all or nothing”, i.e., firms can choose the size of their investment 
and their equity issue. He shows that this has no significant impact 
on the general implications of the pecking order but allows to 
making predictions regarding the relationship between size of the 
equity issue and value. 
c. Narayanan (1988) does not presuppose the existence of an asset. He 
shows that some bad firms might issue and invest in projects with a 
negative NPV (because being overvalued makes it profitable for old 
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shareholders to do so) and that risky debt reduces this problem, thus 
also establishing the standard pecking order of capital. 
d. Heinkel and Zechner (1990) build on Narayanan’s model and 
analyze the effects of issuing preferred shares within a similar 
framework. 
e. Halov and Heider (2004) regard the standard pecking order as the 
result of a special case where information asymmetry exists about 
the value but not about the risk of a firm. They consider the polar 
opposite situation and conjecture that equity is preferred to debt if 
information is asymmetric concerning risk but not concerning value. 
They build a more general framework where asymmetric 
information about risk is also considered and find empirical support, 
thereby also explaining many of empirical problems of the standard 
pecking order model. 
f. Brennan and Kraus (1987) relax the implicit assumption that firms 
can only issue debt or equity and allow for more complex financing 
strategies, such as issuing equity and retiring debt simultaneously. 
They analyze under what conditions such financing strategies may 
costlessly reveal the firms status. 
ad a.) Explicitly building on the model by Myers and Majluf, Korajczyk et 
al. (1992) add a dynamic component to the standard pecking order model: in 
their model they relax Myers and Majluf’s implicit assumption that the 
degree of asymmetric information is static over time. Instead, the degree of 
asymmetric information is fluctuating: While some events decrease the 
information gap (e.g. shareholder meetings), it increases afterwards as time 
passes. Thus, the firm can decrease their asymmetric information costs by 
issuing equity close to such events. Additionally, contrary to Myers and 
Majluf, the project can be postponed. However, postponing the project (and 
the equity issue) is costly, “either because the project being financed could 
lose value if postponed (for instance because a competitor enters the market 
first), or because the firm may have to adopt a higher cost source of interim 
financing.” (Korajczyk, Lucas, & McDonald, 1992, p. 398) 
  18 
 The model assumes that the true value of asset a is revealed at 
regular intervals. In between these information releases at t=i, managers of 
some firms receive private information regarding changes in the value of the 
asset, creating information asymmetries: either their asset’s value has 
increased to ai + " (for good companies) or decreased to ai - " (for bad 
companies), with equal probability. Thus, there are managers who know 
they preside over good firms, managers who know they preside over bad 
firms and managers who do not know for themselves. Over time, the 
fraction of managers who receive private information increases, hence the 
information gap increases over time and issuing equity becomes less 
attractive for good firms. It is also assumed that “projects arrive randomly, 
at a constant aggregate rate q.” (Korajczyk, Lucas, & McDonald, 1992, p. 
400) These projects might evaporate at any time with probability #dt, thus 
making postponing them costly. 
 Korajczyk et al. conjecture and later prove the following equilibrium 
of issuing policies in their model: 
• Good firms issue equity after their next information release in order 
to avoid the information asymmetry costs. 
• Bad firms issue as soon as an investment opportunity arrives. 
• Uninformed manager’s issue decision changes over time: If the 
investment opportunity presents itself early on they are more likely 
to issue and invest, as the information gap is still relatively small and 
issuing equity is relatively cheap in case they are good companies. 
Later on they prefer to wait to learn about the quality of their asset 
before making a decision whether to issue and invest or not. 
In addition, they show how their model suggests that equity price drops 
increase over time after information has been released. Thus, they make the 
following testable predictions and cite relevant empirical studies: 
• Equity issues are more frequent immediately after information has 
been released than before information is released.  They cite various 
empirical studies that support this. 
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• The price drop associated with an equity issue announcement will 
increase over time from the last information release, which is 
consistent with empirical studies. 
ad b.) Krasker (1986) relaxes the assumption that the investment 
opportunity cannot be undertaken partially. In his model, the firm can 
choose to reduce the size of a necessary equity issue by only financing a 
part of the project.  Krasker introduces a proceeds function, which measures 
the income derived from an issue of any given size. He then shows that 
there are cases where this proceeds function is bounded, i.e. there is a 
maximum amount of money a firm can raise by issuing equity, irrespective 
of the total size of the issue, as one unit of proceeds beyond this maximum 
would increase firm value by less than one unit – which goes against the 
interest of old shareholders. As Krasker points out, intuition suggests that 
this should be the case for firms whose prospects are poor. However, 
according to the model, “the opposite is true. […] equity rationing must 
prevail if the firm’s investment opportunities are known to be ‘sufficiently 
good’ […].” (Krasker, 1986, p. 94) 
 Krasker draws two important conclusions from his model: 
• Underinvestment must occur even if companies are able to partially 
invest in projects, confirming the standard pecking order theory 
without the – often unrealistic – “all or nothing” restriction. 
• Poor firms are less likely to engage in equity rationing and thus price 
drops when an equity issue is announced should increase with the 
size of the issue.  
ad c.) Narayanan (1988) constructs a model where no asset is in place. This 
allows him to consider cases such as start-ups, spin-offs of established 
companies, and mature firms with little private information. In Myers and 
Majluf’s model, this led to a corner solution, where any firm issued and 
invested, regardless of type. Narayanan’s model does not produce this result 
as asymmetric information stems from differences in firm-specific factors 
that are known only by insiders, such as quality of management, corporate 
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culture, etc.; these factors concerning firm quality are expressed in a vector 
variable. Each company has an investment project, where the value depends 
on the quality of the firm, which results in some projects having a negative 
net present value; contrary to Myers and Majluf, these projects are not 
automatically discarded. 
 If companies are only allowed to raise funds by issuing equity, 
Narayanan shows that under the conditions outlined in his model at least 
some companies with a negative-NPV project (“lemon companies”) will 
issue and invest: Investors cannot differentiate them from good companies, 
thus overvaluing them. Because they are overvalued, they can still afford to 
lose some money in their negative investment project while being better off 
than without an equity issue.  Thus, the ex-ante value of all firms is reduced 
due to overinvestment in NPV-negative investment projects. 
 If, however, firms are able to issue risky debt, at least some lemon 
companies will be excluded from the market: Debt constitutes a fixed claim 
and thus the threat of bankruptcy is higher for lemons if they are financed 
through debt. There will still be lemons that profit from issuing debt 
because they are overvalued. However, some firms are bad enough that they 
will only issue and invest equity but never debt. Thus, in order to exclude 
said companies, good firms will only issue debt. For the worst firms, issuing 
equity is the only remaining option, but doing so would instantly identify 
them. This excludes them from the market and thereby raises the ex-ante 
value of all the other companies, because fewer investments with a negative 
NPV are undertaken. 
 Narayanan’s model also predicts the standard pecking order in 
financing a firms operations and a fall in stock price if equity is issued. Yet, 
contrary to Myers and Majluf – where debt is issued as it is less prone to 
undervaluation – debt is used in order to exclude the most severely 
overvalued (i.e. the worst) firms in the market, which reduces welfare loss 
through overinvestment and thereby raises the ex-ante values of firms. 
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ad d.) Heinkel and Zechner (1990) extend the idea by Narayanan: Their 
model is very similar to his; however, before the investment opportunity 
arises and information asymmetry occurs, management can issue securities 
without facing adverse selection costs. Given this possibility, firms will 
choose a capital structure that avoids adverse selection costs when they 
arise. They basically use Narayanan’s model, where overinvestment occurs 
but extend it for another period where management as well as the market 
know the distribution of good and bad projects. Thus, at t0 information is 
symmetric and all firms are entirely equity financed but may choose to issue 
a certain amount of debt and pay a dividend with the proceeds. At t1 they 
receive a private signal and an investment opportunity (which might have a 
negative net present value), where external capital is required. At t2 the truth 
comes out and information is symmetric again. If firms remain entirely 
equity financed at t=0, Heinkel and Zechner obtain the same result as 
Narayanan: Firms lose ex-ante value, as some firms overinvest. However, 
firms can issue debt and pay a dividend equal to the proceeds, thereby 
creating an underinvestment incentive, as debt constitutes a fixed claim that 
has to be settled at t=2, which will not be possible for firms who have 
invested in a bad project. Therefore, firms will choose a debt level at t=0 
that creates underinvestment incentives equal to the expected 
overinvestment incentives projected for t=1. At t=1, bad firms will regret 
having chosen the debt, but ex-ante, firm value will increase for firms who 
issue debt at t=0. Contrary to the pecking order model, this effect creates an 
optimum debt level, as firms try to balance the effects of over- and 
underinvestment incentives. 
 Introducing preferred stock to the model creates an additional 
overinvestment incentive: This version of the model assumes that preferred 
stock is outstanding, which pays a dividend at t=1 but can be in arrear, 
which allows the firm to invest the preferred dividend instead of paying it. 
Equity holders would reap the benefits of the project but preferred stock 
holders would carry a significant portion of the project’s downside 
potential. Thus, firms with outstanding preferred stock have an additional 
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overinvestment incentive, which can be balanced through additional debt, as 
above. 
 Adding taxes to the model, debt is issued for two reasons: balancing 
the overinvestment incentives and creating tax shields. Of course, the 
positive effect of tax shields is also bounded by underinvestment problems. 
Yet, as they demonstrated before, issuing preferred shares creates additional 
overinvestment incentives and thus room for additional debt and tax shields. 
Alternatively, preferred stock could be used to make room for debt in order 
to avoid adverse selection costs of an equity issue. Heinkel and Zechner 
note that their model predicts preferred stock issues as a signal for growth 
opportunities and that “firms with very low or no growth opportunities do 
not issue preferred shares.” (Heinkel & Zechner, 1990, p. 20) 
ad e.) Halov and Heider (2004) build on Giammarino and Neave’s (1982) 
intuition (mentioned Myers and Majluf’s (1984) and Myers (1984)) that 
debt might carry an adverse selection cost if there is asymmetric 
information regarding risk. In order to illustrate this, they give the following 
example: Again, two types of firms operate in the market. There are no 
existing assets in place, but all firms have an investment opportunity that 
requires I = 100 of outside capital. If successful, the type A firm’s project 
returns 400, a type B firm’s project 300. If the project fails, nothing is 
returned in either case.  Any given type of firm occurs equally often. At 
first, it is assumed that both firm’s projects succeed with a probability of 
50%. Thus, a type A firm’s net present value is NPVA = 50% * 400 – 100 = 
100; while a type B firm’s net present value is NPVB = 50% * 300 – 100 = 
50. It is assumed that risk is diversifiable; the time value of money is 
ignored. 
If the market can differentiate between type A and B firms (i.e. no 
asymmetric information), both firms will be charged a 100% risk premium 
on their debt repayment, as both firms fail with a probability of 50%. Debt 
repayment F will be 200 for each firm, as 200 * 50% = 100 = I. If equity is 
issued, a type A firm will have to sell 50% of its stock as 50% * 50% * 400 
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= 100 = I; a type B firm has to sell 66,67% as 66,67% * 50% * 300 = 100 = 
I. Either way, both firms retain their NPV. As expected by Modigliani and 
Miller (1958), the financing structure is irrelevant without asymmetric 
information (and other frictions). 
If the market cannot differentiate between firm types, both firms will 
have to sell 57,14% of their equity as 50% * (57.14% * (400 * 50%) + 
57,14% * (300 * 50%)) = 100 = I. If we compare this with the numbers 
above, a type A firm will have to sell 7.14% more of their stock than with 
symmetric information while the type B firm sells less than before. Debt on 
the other hand does not carry any adverse selection cost: As investors know 
that both firms have a 50% chance of failing, debt repayments will still 
amount to 200: 50% * (200 * 50%) + 50 * (200 * 50%) = 100. Thus, firms 
(i.e. type A firms) prefer debt to equity, which is in line with Myers and 
Majluf’s standard pecking order. The results for both cases are summarized 
in the following table (assuming the project is successful). 
Type A B 
Information Symmetric Asymmetric Symmetric Asymmetric 
Cost of Debt 200 200 200 200 
Cost of Equity 200 228.57 200 171.43 
 
However, a slight alteration of the assumptions changes the results 
dramatically: If we assume that type B firms are successful with a 
probability of 66.67% instead of 50% their NPV changes to 2/3 * 300 – 100 
= 100, which is the same as the type A firm’s NPV. Risk, however, is 
different between the firms now. Under full information, both firms will 
have to sell half of their stock as equity in order to raise the necessary funds: 
50% * 50% * 400 = 100 = I, or 50% * 66.67% * 300 = 100 = I; for type A 
or type B firms respectively. This means that bad firms have to sell less 
equity than in the example above, where they were less likely to succeed. 
Type A firms, again, will pay 200 for debt. Type B firms however will only 
pay 150 for their debt as 150 * 66.67 = 100 = I.  
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If we assume investors to be unable to differentiate between firms 
again, both firms would still have to sell half their stock in order to raise the 
necessary funds as 
50% * (50% * 400) + 50% * (66.67% * 300) = 100 = I. 
However, debt repayment would be D=171.43 for both firms: 
50% * (50 * D) + 50% * (66.67% * D) = 100 = I. 
Thus, type B firms would overpay 21.43 for their debt, while the 
type A firms underpay. Again, we can summarize the costs of capital as 
follows (again under the condition that the projects are successful): 
Type A B 
Information Symmetric Asymmetric Symmetric Asymmetric 
Cost of Debt 200 171.43 150 171.43 
Cost of Equity 200 200 150 150 
 
In this case, type B firms will want to issue equity while type A 
firms will want to issue debt. Investors are aware that they are not fully 
informed about the firm’s risk and therefore will not buy debt. As expected, 
asymmetric information concerning risk has flipped the pecking order 
upside down. 
(Of course, this example only illustrates the direct adverse selection 
costs of respective securities. In both cases, both firms will issue the 
security that does not incur such costs – although one of them will do so 
only reluctantly. There will be no indirect costs due to either 
underinvestment, as there is no asset in place, or overinvestment, as both 
projects have a positive NPV.) 
Halov and Heider build on the empirical model proposed by Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999). As explained above, Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
ran a pooled panel regression between the difference in debt !" and the 
financing deficit DEF,#
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!Dit = a + bDEFit + $ 
expecting a being 0 and b being large. Halov and Heider on the other hand 
expect b to be high only for firms without asymmetric information 
regarding risk. Thus, they group firms into deciles according to their 
asymmetric information about risk and run regressions for each decile 
individually. As they expect the decile with the highest degree of 
asymmetric information about risk to mostly issue equity, they also test for 
equity issues. Thus they run the following regressions for each decile n: 
!Dit = an + DEFit + $ and 
 !Eit = an + DEFit + $. 
According to their reasoning, they expect the financing deficit 
coefficients for debt to decrease with each decile, i.e.  >  > … > , 
while the financing deficit coefficient for equity should increase with each 
decile:  <  < … < .  
In order to rank the firms, Halov and Heider rely on the recent 
volatility of assets as a proxy for asymmetric information about risk.  
Running the test on their whole sample, they obtain a coefficient of 0.375 
(R2 = 0.36), which is slightly larger than that of Frank and Goyal (b = 0.28 
and R2 = 0.14), but much smaller than that of Shyam-Sunders and Myers (b 
= 0.75, R2 = 0.68). However, running the test on the lowest decile only, their 
results are much in line with the standard pecking order, obtaining a 
coefficient of 0.87 (R2 = 0.85). Their results for all deciles (Figure 1) lend 
much support to their general pecking order theory, as the debt coefficient is 
clearly decreasing along the deciles while the equity coefficient is 
increasing.  
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Figure 1: Empirical results of Halov and Heider (2004) 
ad f.) Brennan and Kraus (1987) criticize the pecking order model because it 
neglects securities other than equity and debt (such as convertible bonds) 
and does not allow for more complex financing strategies. They build a 
model that does not only allow firms to issue a specific security, but also 
issue or retire different securities simultaneously. For example, a firm might 
issue equity and use parts of the proceeds to pay off debt. Such financing 
strategies, which are costless, may be used to signal the prospects of a 
company.   
 In order to analyze the properties of financing strategies that allow 
costless signaling, Brennan and Kraus build the following model: Z, which 
is public knowledge, is a set of all feasible financing strategies available in a 
given economy. T is a set of all possible firm types (with regards to future 
payoffs) in a given economy. The true, privately known value of a specific 
financing strategy z issued by a specific firm t is V(z,t). The price for the 
securities that are issued using this strategy is P(z). Brennan and Kraus also 
assume that management acts in their (existing) shareholder’s interest, thus 
if outside capital is raised in order to finance an investment of I, 
management of a firm t seeks to choose a financing strategy z*(t) so that 
P(z*) – V(z*) is maximized. Under these assumptions, Brennan and Kraus 
show that if a certain financing strategy is chosen at all, it will be chosen by 
firm type t* where V(z*,t*) is the lowest possible value and equal to I. 
Therefore, the firm type t* can be inferred by outside investors, who will 
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therefore price the set of securities correctly, i.e. P(z) = V(Z*,t*) = I. They 
also show that such a financing strategy might exist. 
 In order to illustrate their findings, they give the following example 
(Brennan & Kraus, 1987, p. 1234f): Again, two firm types exist. At t=0, the 
distribution of earnings and types is public knowledge. While insiders know 
which type their firm belongs to, investors only know that any given firm 
can be good or bad with equal probability. All firms have 40 shares 
outstanding and debt of 100, which matures at t=1. Both firms have an asset 
in place, which has an expected value of 120 for t=1, i.e. their equity is 
priced 20 at t=0. They also have an investment opportunity, which requires 
investment of 10. If a firm decides to invest, their t=1 payouts and t=0 full-
information valuations are as follows: 
 Payoffs at t=1 Security values at t=0 
 p=50% p=50% EV Debt Equity Total 
Good firm 100 200 150 100 20 120 
Bad firm 80 195 137.5 90 37.5 127.5 
 
Brennan and Kraus conjecture the following worst-case financings: Good 
firms raise 110 in equity, pay off their debt and invest in the project. Bad 
firms issue equity worth 10 and invest in the project. Good firms are 
identified and therefore able to sell 110 shares for the full information value 
of 1 each; their outstanding equity will be valued at 40. Bad firms will sell 
10.66 shares at the full information price of 0.938 per share, which means 
that outstanding equity will be valued at (40/50.67) * 47.5 = 37.5. 
 This set of strategies can only be the equilibrium outcome, if there is 
no incentive for either firm to deviate: If the good firm mimics the bad one 
by issuing 10.66 shares at 9.38 each, the old shareholder’s payoff is 
(40/50.68) * 50 = 39.46 < 40. If the bad firm mimics the good one old 
shareholder’s equity will be worth (40/150) * 137.5 = 36.67 < 37.5. The 
good firm does not mimic the bad one because their equity would be 
underpriced while the bad firm does not mimic the good one, as they would 
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have to retire their debt at 100 although it is only worth 90. Thus, neither 
firm has an incentive to deviate and good firms can reveal their state by 
issuing enough equity to retire their outstanding debt and invest in the 
project. 
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3 The Austrian Support Scheme for Financial 
Institutions 
In late October 2008, the Austrian Parliament approved a support scheme 
for financial institutions, which aimed to stabilize its financial markets. Two 
laws were enacted in order to accomplish this: The 
“Interbankmarktstärkungsgesetz” (IBSG) initiated a clearing bank, which 
would raise money from financial institutions and appropriate those funds to 
banks that endured a liquidity shortage. This clearing bank was secured by 
guarantees of the state. The “Finanzmarktstabilitätsgesetz” (FinStaG) 
authorized the state to provide financial institutions with loans and capital. 
Both laws were authorized by the European Commission, which amended 
the legislative pieces in order to make them comply with standards 
concerning competitive advantages. The first part of this chapter gives a 
chronological overview and casual observations regarding the events 
surrounding the enactment of the support scheme. The second part gives a 
more detailed description of the scheme’s measures, especially with regard 
to recapitalization of banks. 
3.1 Chronology of Events Surrounding the Support 
Scheme 
Since 2007, financial institutions throughout the world have suffered a rapid 
decline in their stock prices. The crisis began in the United States, where a 
rapid decline in housing prices caused massive losses for financial 
institutions who held subprime mortgage papers: To give a few examples, 
from Oct. 5 2007 until July 3 2009 Citigroup Inc. went from 48.30 to 2.88; 
American International Group, Inc. from 1387.80 to 18.25; Lehman 
Brothers Holdings Inc. filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on Sept. 
14 2008. More broadly, the NYSE Financial Sector Index – which 
encompasses all financial institutions listed on the New York Stock 
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Exchange – went from 9710.65 on Oct. 5 2007 to 3778.02 on July 3 20091. 
In October of 2008, the United States government passed the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act, which enacted a program to purchase illiquid 
assets and increase equity of financial institutions – the Troubled Asset 
Relieve Program (or TARP). (House Committee on Financial Services, 
2008) 
 Meanwhile, the financial crisis had spread around the world and 
started to affect Austrian Banks: By the end of September 2008, the two 
largest financial institutions listed in the ATX, Raiffeisen International 
Holding and Erste Group Bank, were trading in their low 20s, down from 
over 110 and 55 respectively a year ago2. At that point, banks were still 
claiming that their situation was stable. On September 30 2008, Michael 
Ikrath, general secretary of the “Sparkassenverband” (part of Erste Group) 
told the Austrian financial newspaper “Wirtschaftsblatt”, that there were 
some problems but nothing to worry about (“[…]es gibt immer noch keinen 
Anlass zur Sorge”). A spokesperson for the Raiffeisen Zentralbanken AG 
(RZB) stated that his institute had no liquidity constraint but that 
refinancing was increasingly expensive (“Die RZB hat kein 
Liquiditätsproblem, allerdings wird die Refinanzierung teuer, diesem Trend 
können wir uns nicht entziehen.”). (Kreuzer, 2008a) 
 Two days later, Veit Sorger, president of the Austrian Industrialists’ 
Association, called for a stabilization scheme for Austrian Banks, similar to 
that in the United States. Scaling for Austria’s size, he suggested providing 
funds of about 16 billion Euros (APA, 2008a). On October 4 2008, the 
heads of states of France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy met in Paris to 
discuss measures against the financial crisis in Europe (DPA, 2008a). One 
week later, all heads of state of the Euro-zone met. While no agreement 
regarding measures on the European level was reached, states coordinated 
                                                
1 End of day stock and index price quotes retrieved from Google Finance. (n.d.). Retrieved 3. July 
2009 from http://finance.google.com 
2 Stock price quotes retrieved from ecetra Internet Services AG. (n.d.). brokerjet. Retrieved 3. July 
2009 from http://www.brokerjet.at 
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their individual stabilization schemes. It was also agreed that legislation 
would be reviewed by the European Commission in order to avoid 
competitive advantages of certain banks. (DPA, 2008b) 
 Austria’s then Prime Minister, Dr. Alfred Gusenbauer, presented a 
general outline of the stabilization scheme on October 13 2008. He 
announced that the stabilization package would be endowed with 100 billion 
in funds: 15 billion would be available as loans and participation capital, 85 
billion as a guarantee for loans in order to increase interbank lending.  It is 
worth noting that many of the parties involved were still adamant that 
Austrian banks did not actually require such a stabilization package:  Alfred 
Gusenbauer said, “Unsere Banken sind solide und verfügen über 
ausreichend Kapital. Wir sind der Meinung, dass man aber für die Krise 
noch besser gewappnet ist, wenn die Eigenkapitalbasis gestärkt werden 
kann.” (Bundeskanzleramt Österreich, 2008) CEO of Erste Group Bank, 
Andreas Treichl, concurred: According to him, the stabilization scheme was 
not only intended to secure banks against interferences of the crisis, but 
would also help expansion in central and eastern Europe (APA, 2008b). His 
colleague of EZB, Walter Rothensteiner, also stressed that banks just 
needed a guarantee in order to facilitate interbank lending – implying that 
said guarantees would probably not become effective (APA, 2008c). 
Directors of the Austrian “Finanzmarktaufsicht” also stressed that Austrian 
banks were in good financial shape (APA, 2008b). While it cannot be ruled 
out that such an optimistic point of view is valid, it is obvious that banks 
would have an incentive to downplay the importance of the stabilization 
scheme. 
 In the following week, rumors (from sources within the parliament) 
surfaced, which suggested that banks were coordinating their actions in 
order to avoid sending a negative signal. Banks rejected such allegations 
and even publicly doubted whether they would take advantage of the 
proposed stabilization package at all: While Bank Austria and RZB both 
announced that they would want to use the services of the proposed clearing 
bank, both banks claimed that they did not consider using state-issued 
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equity. Volksbanken CEO Manfred Kunert was not willing to comment on 
future plans regarding the package, yet announced that his bank did not 
need any help offered in the scheme. Bawag board member Regine Prehofer 
announced that her bank was not interested in any kind of financial support; 
rather, her bank had enough liquid funds in order to provide some of them 
through the proposed clearing bank. Ikrath, spokesperson for Erste Group, 
acknowledged that his bank might be in need of recapitalization; yet, he 
emphasized that this need for additional capital emerged at least to some 
extent due to state-financed recapitalization of foreign competitors (APA, 
2008d). Again, whether banks actually were in need of state-funds at that 
point or not cannot be said with certainty. Yet, it is clear that banks whose 
survival actually relied on money from the state would have an incentive to 
misrepresent their situation in order to avoid sending a bad signal to the 
market.  
 On October 26 2008, the Austrian parliament passed legislation 
concerning the stabilization scheme: Interbankmarktsta rku ngsgesetz 
(IBSG) und Finanzmarktstabilita tsgesetz (FinStaG). The same day, the 
first bank announced entering negotiations for state-funds: Kommunalkredit 
Austria AG, subsidiary of Österreichische Volksbanken AG (ÖVAG) and 
Dexia, which had already received state-funds from France and Belgium. 
Again, they cited subsidies paid to competitors as the cause for their need 
for state-funds. The Austrian federal state acquired 99.78 percent of the 
bank from ÖVAG and Dexia. Both had to convert their obligations 
Kommunalkredit had with them to participation shares, which contribute to 
the bank’s equity (APA, 2008f). In the beginning of 2009, the Austrian state 
contributed another 372.5 million Euros participation capital. 
 On October 30, Erste Group Bank made the first move of Austria’s 
major banks and announced that they had negotiated 2.7 billion Euros in 
state-funded participating certificates, with a preferred dividend of 8 percent 
p.a. Again, Treichl made clear that he regarded his bank’s situation as solid; 
however, he regarded taking up the state’s offer as necessary in order to be 
prepared for the hard economic times that lay ahead of the bank. Yet, it was 
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obvious that the bank would not manage to attain a 9 percent equity ratio – 
which is the international norm for banks, whereas the legal minimum is 4 
percent – without taking external funds. Treichl also announced that his 
bank would pay a dividend within the quarter, although he did not comment 
on its size. The announcement led to a jump in the bank’s stock value: Just 
before noon, each share increased by over 15% (Johann, 2008). This 
increase in stock price after equity-increasing funds have been accepted – 
from the state, no less – might seem surprising. However, given that the 
package became a necessity in the first place is a clear indication that such a 
deal could not be negotiated in the market place, i.e. the state overpaid for 
the participation certificates to the benefit of the shareholders. Apart from 
that, it could be argued that the market estimated a high probability of 
bankruptcy, which was avoided due to the new funds. Hence – under this 
assumption –, the increase in share price (or parts of it) would be the result 
of the probability of bankruptcy diminishing drastically. The same day, 
other banks that had previously precluded a direct state involvement through 
participating certificates, changed their strategy: Both RZB and ÖVAG 
announced that they would reevaluate the offer and would accept it if it was 
in the interest of their customers, shareholders and employees (Kreuzer, 
2008b). 
 On November 11, Martin Rasinger, lobbyist for private minority 
shareholders, claimed that private investors would be interested in 
participating in the stabilization scheme (Himmelbauer, Wilhelm Rasinger: 
Auch Privatanleger wollen beim Banken-Hilfspaket einpringen, 2008a).  
On November 12, Tilo Berlin, CEO of Hypo Group, announced that 
he would request 700 million of participation capital (Himmelbauer, 2008). 
On November 28, ÖVAG announced that they would apply for a billion 
Euros capital from state-funds in order to increase their equity ratio from 7.1 
percent (Fercher, 2008). RZB also held a meeting of their shareholders on 
November 25, where they obtained approval of issuing up to two billion 
Euros in participating certificates to the Austrian state (RZB, 2009a). On 
December 4, Regina Prehofer of Bawag announced that they were analyzing 
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possibilities of obtaining capital from the state, also giving distortions of 
competition as a reason (Lechner, 2008). The Austrian government had 
previously announced that they were looking for a special solution in order 
to supply Bawag and Bank Austria with participating capital: Both banks 
are owned by foreigners – US fund Cerberus and Italian Unicredit Group; 
hence, the state considered provisions that guaranteed that the capital would 
not be passed through to the owners (Kreuzer, 2008c). 
Meanwhile, the Austrian government held negotiations with the 
European Commission, who wanted to amend some of the terms (see 
below). After some delays, Austria and the EU reached an agreement on 
December 9 (Kreuzer, 2008d). 
Erste Bank declared that they would try to raise capital from private 
investors at eight percent preferred dividend p.a. By March 4, they had 
managed to secure 540 million Euros participation capital from private 
investors (Kreuzer, 2009).  
On March 18 2009, Alessandro Profumo, CEO of Bank Austria 
mother Unicredit Group was granted permission by his shareholders to raise 
up to four billion Euros in state issued capital. He announced that 2.7 of 
those four millions should be provided by the Austrian government. He also 
announced that he would also issue participation certificates to private 
investors, hoping to raise at least 30 percent of the whole package at eight 
percent p.a. preferred dividend, which would also reduce the rate of the 
state-supplied portion (Himmelbauer, 2009)  
Eventually, by June 30, the day the stabilization scheme expired, the 
following banks had agreed to issue participation certificates to the state and 
private investors: 
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 Participation Capital  
Bank Total Private Rating3 
Erste Group 4 ~1.75 billion 540 million S&P, M, F 
RZB5 2.5 billion 750 million S&P, M 
Bank Austria6 up to 2.7 billion 
(estimated) 
probably 30% or 
more 
S&P, M 
BAWAG P.S.K.7 550 million 0 (for now) M 
ÖVAG8 1 billion 0 M 
Hypo Group Alpe Adria9 900 million 0 M 
(Erste Group, 2009a)(Erste Group, 2009b)(RZB, 2009b)(RZB, 2009c)(Bank Austria, 2009a)(BAWAG P.S.K., 2009a)(BAWAG P.S.K., 2009b)(ÖVAG, 2009a)(ÖVAG, 2009b)(OTS, 2008)(Hypo Group 
Alpe Adria, 2007) 
As we saw, most banks that ended up taking funds provided by the 
state announced that they would not do so. Whether they genuinely changed 
their mind or whether they were trying to signal positive expectations – 
unconvincingly but cheaply – is impossible to say. Yet, it is clear that firms 
have an incentive to portray their situation better than it is, generally, but 
especially if a future equity issue is likely. 
3.2 Terms of the Austrian Stabilization Scheme 
The Austrian Stabilization Scheme is based on two bills enacted on October 
26 2008, one ordinance (Verordnung), enacted by the minister of finance on 
October 30 2008, a decision by the European Commission declared on 
December 9 2008, and various changes made to other laws. 
 The main bills are the Interbankmarktstärkungsgesetz (IBSG) and 
the Finanzmarktstabilitätsgesetz (FinStaG). The IBSG allows the minister of 
finance to assume liability for loans made between banks, thereby 
reestablishing trust between financial institutes. The FinStaG, on the other 
hand, allows the state to directly provide capital to financial institutions. 
                                                
3 S&P = Standard & Poor’s, M = Moody’s Investors Service, F = Fitch, Inc. 
4 Erste Group (2009a), Erste Group (2009b). 
5 RZB (2009b), RZB (2009c). 
6 Bank Austria (2009a). 
7 BAWAG P.S.K. (2009a), BAWAG P.S.K. (2009b) 
8 ÖVAG (2009a), ÖVAG (2009b) 
9 OTS (2008), Hypo Group Alpe Adria (2007) 
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 The IBSG determines the relationship between a clearing bank and 
the state: The clearing bank is operated and owned by Austrian banks and 
acts as an agent for loans between their members. They provide all the 
capital that is loaned between participating banks, i.e. the state does not 
provide any funds. However, the state can temporarily assume liability for 
bad debt that results from such transactions. The maximum amount of loans 
the state can guarantee is 75 billion Euros. These provisions aim to facilitate 
interbank lending and thereby reducing the likeliness of short-term liquidity 
shortages (Republik Österreich, 2008, p. 1). The European Commission 
declared that the Austrian state was allowed to guarantee liabilities of the 
clearing bank. However, they maintained that banks are not allowed to refer 
to the state guarantee when conducting business; neither are they allowed to 
abuse the bank guarantee for highly competitive behavior. They also 
demanded that each financial institute’s line of credit is limited based on 
objective criteria. (European Commission, 2009, p. 8) 
 The FinStaG provides an additional array of instruments to be used 
at the minister of finance’s discretion: If the funds available through the 
clearing bank are not sufficient, the minister of finance can assume liability 
for the bank’s outstanding debt or for securities of third parties in the 
possession of a bank. In addition, the state might provide loans or equity, 
participation capital and convertible bonds. In cases where these instruments 
are insufficient, banks can be socialized; however, only as a last resort, if 
great economic damage has to be expected otherwise. 15 billion Euros were 
allocated for such measures(Republik Österreich, 2008, p. 3f). 
The minister of finance enacted an ordinance, which specified 
details of the stabilization scheme. However, these specifications were still 
rather vague: The preferred dividend rate for participation capital issued by 
the state would have to be set according to market terms (“marktkonform”) 
based on objective parameters, so that they conform with type, maturity and 
risk of the instrument. Similarly, dividend payments were only allowed 
within reasonable limits (“angemessenem Ausmaß”) (Molterer, 2008, p. 2f). 
Of course, these specifications left a wide range for interpretation. However, 
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Erste Group bank announced that they had reached agreement with the state 
that they would pay a preferred dividend of eight percent p.a. on 
participation capital provided by the state (Johann, 2008). Austrian Press 
Agency, APA, also reported that banks would be allowed to pay a dividend 
of up to 30 percent of their profits (APA, 2008e).  
 The European Commission provided more accurate specifications: 
Fundamentally sound banks are only allowed to pay dividends of up to 17.5 
percent of their profits. Distressed banks are not allowed to pay any 
dividends at all. For fundamentally sound banks, equity-like securities that 
have an interest-component (e.g. preferred shares, participation capital or 
similar instruments) have to pay a dividend of 9.3 percent p.a. if they are 
paid back at par. Alternatively, they can pay a dividend of only 8 percent; 
then however, they have to be paid back at 10 percent over par. In order to 
give an incentive to pay back the funds as soon as possible, dividend should 
increase over time: in the sixth and seventh year, the dividend would 
increase by 0.5% each. In the eight year it would increase by another 75 
basis points. From the ninth year onwards, it would increase by one percent 
each year. However, dividends are capped at the 12-month Euribor plus 
10%. In addition, the capital would have to be paid back at 50 percent over 
par after the tenth year. Distressed banks have to pay a dividend of over 10 
percent p.a. 
The European Commission summarized both payment schemes in the 
following table: 
 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Scheme 1: 9.3% preferred dividend, retirement at par 
Dividend 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.8 10.3 11.05 12.05 13.05 14.05 
Markup          50 50 
Avg. Yield 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.37 9.47 9.61 9.79 12.68 12.48 
Scheme 1: 8% preferred dividend, retirement at 10% over par 
Dividend 8 8 8 8 8 8.5 9 9.75 10.75 11.75 12.75 
Markup 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 50 50 
Avg. Yield 18 12.7 10.99 10.15 9.65 9.38 9.25 9.21 9.25 11.56 11.37 
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Thus, the state would earn around 9.3 percent p.a. in dividend payments on 
participation capital, on average. 
However, the European Commission made an exception from this rule: 
If a fundamentally sound bank raised more than 30 percent of their newly 
issued participation capital from private parties, of which no more than 10 
percent are existing shareholders, the participation capital issued by the state 
would only have to promise a preferred dividend equal to that agreed upon 
with private parties. Under such conditions, the limit on dividend payments 
would be omitted as well. The European commission claimed that this 
would make it more likely that the dividends reflect competitive market 
rates and thus would mitigate the competitive advantage gained through 
capital provided by the state (European Commission, 2009, p. 20f). In 
addition, the European Commission decided that each bank may not receive 
more than 3 billion of participation capital (European Commission, 2009, p. 
9f).  
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4 The Stabilization Scheme and Equity Issues 
In chapter 2 we have seen how adverse selection costs might lead to 
underinvestment if a firm only has access to risky securities such as equity. 
In the third chapter the terms of the Austrian financial markets stabilization 
scheme were presented. In this part, we will show how certain legislative 
provisions might mitigate the underinvestment problem, i.e. given that firms 
only have access to equity or equity-like securities, the likelihood that good 
firms still issue and invest is increased.  
 As we saw above, the European Commission granted banks the 
possibility of paying a preferred dividend on state issued participation 
capital equal to the market rate, if at least 30 percent of the newly issued 
participation capital are provided by private investors. Given that the market 
rate is below the rate set by the European Commission, banks would receive 
a discount on their preferred dividends conditional on the issuance of equity. 
Simultaneously, better banks pay a premium on their privately issued 
participation capital due to asymmetric information. Thus, issuing equity 
has a cost and two benefits: Asymmetric information makes issuance costly, 
but the discount and the investment project benefit firm value. 
A numerical example will illustrate the effects of the stabilization 
scheme on issuing decisions under asymmetric information. The example is 
very similar to that of Myers and Majluf; changes are made in order to 
demonstrate the effects of participation capital and of the relevant provision 
in the stabilization scheme. It is structured as follows: 
• There are two types of banks: Both have an asset in place, a, and an 
investment opportunity, b. Any given bank belongs to either type 
with equal probability. Banks do not hold financial slack. 
• There are three time periods: In period one, information about bank 
types and distribution are symmetric. In period two, management 
learns which type their bank belongs to and has to decide whether to 
issue securities and invest or pass up on the investment project. In 
period three, the economy ends and banks are liquidated. 
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• The investment project requires an investment of I and cannot be 
postponed. Both banks’ investment opportunities have a positive net 
present value. For simplicity’s sake, we assume that the bank may 
not take a partial stake in the project. Krasker (1986) shows that this 
is a valid simplification that does not change the results 
significantly. 
• For either bank type, the cash flows derived from both the asset and 
the investment opportunity are uncertain at t=0. At t=1, the economy 
may either turn for the worse or improve. If it turns for the worse, 
both the existing asset and the investment opportunity (if taken) 
incur a loss for both types of banks. If it improves, both assets yield 
a profit for both banks. The losses incurred by a bad bank are higher 
than that of good bank, while the profits made by a good bank are 
higher than those of a bad bank. 
• There is no asymmetric information about risk, i.e. following Halov 
and Heider’s logic the standard pecking order theory applies to 
banks. This is consistent with their findings that “credit ratings 
reduce asymmetric information about risk” (Halov & Heider, 2004, 
p. 16), as all Austrian banks who took advantage of the stabilization 
package have a rating (see above). Intuition also suggests that a 
financial crisis leaves management equally in the dark about risk as 
their investors, i.e. information about risk is distributed 
symmetrically, as there is not a lot of information to begin with.  
• Banks finance the project either through participation capital or not 
at all.  
o Any form of capital less risky than equity (e.g. debt) is 
omitted because the main reason for the stabilization scheme 
was that banks had to increase their equity ratio (see above). 
It is concluded that any chosen financing strategy may not 
decrease the equity ratio. Mixed financing strategies with a 
net increase in equity are omitted for simplicity. 
o Participation capital is always chosen over normal equity. 
While participation capital is not less risky than equity, it has 
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no disadvantage, but – in certain instances – has advantages 
as it might lead to a discounts on state issued participation 
capital, i.e. firms might be indifferent between equity and 
participation capital, or they might prefer the latter; they will 
never prefer equity. For simplicity’s sake, we assume that 
firms always choose participation capital, even if they are 
indifferent. 
• Existing assets are financed through debt, equity and participation 
capital. The latter is provided by the state and requires the payment 
of a preferred dividend of PDstate. Two cases are explored: In each, 
PDstate either is adjusted to market rates of newly issued participation 
shares, or not. Hence, it is assumed that banks have already decided 
to issue participation certificates to the state: Austrian public 
authorities have declared that the stabilization scheme was 
imperative (“zwingend notwendig” (European Commission, 2009, p. 
9)) in order to avoid damages to the financial markets, implying that 
participation capital issued to the state was crucial to the survival of 
the bank and had already occurred at the time of the issue decision 
regarding participation certificates to private parties. 
• Management acts in the interest of existing equity holders. 
• Equity holders are assumed to be passive, i.e. they do not sell their 
shares before t=1, where they are liquidated.  
• Equity holders do not buy newly issued participation certificates. 
The terms of the stabilization scheme only allow 1/3 of the private 
capital to be provided by existing shareholders, in order to be 
eligible for the discount (see above). Thus, this assumption is 
derived from the terms of the stabilization scheme. 
• The market prices all securities according to their expected future 
payoff, based on publicly available information. The time value of 
money is neglected for simplicity.  
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For the numerical example, the following t=1 payoff values are given for 
the asset in place a and the investment opportunity b for each bank in each 
state: 
Type of bank 
Good 
p=50% 
Bad 
p=50% 
State of the economy 
Worsens 
p=50% 
Improves 
p=50% 
NPV 
Worsens 
p=50% 
Improves 
p=50% 
NPV 
a 260 480 70 150 400 -25 
b 75 140 7,5 70 135 2.5 
Total CF 335 620  220 535  
 
The project requires an investment of 100. Both banks have the following 
securities outstanding: 
• 100 Debt, mature at t=1 
• 100 worth of participation certificates, with a preferred dividend of 
60 (due at t=1), owned by the state 
• 100 (book value) of equity 
Thus, if both banks do not invest at t=0, the t=1 payoffs and t=-1 value of all 
the respective securities would be as follows: 
Type of firm Good Bad 
State of the 
economy 
Worsens Improves V Worsens Improves V 
Debt 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Participation 
Certificates 
(State) 
80 170 125 25 170 97.5 
Equity 80 210 145 25 130 77.5 
 
Debt is senior to both equity and participation certificates. If the economy 
worsens, equity holders and the state bear the losses to equal parts. If it 
improves, the state receives 160 (face value and preferred dividend), while 
the equity holders receive the residual value. Management invests in the 
project if it increases the value of equity. Both investment projects have a 
positive net present value, so if securities are priced under full information, 
banks can be expected to issue and invest. Following Myers and Majluf, it 
might occur that adverse selection costs are so high that they exceed the 
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equity holder’s share of the project’s value. Thus, if information is 
asymmetric, the good firm should pass up the project, as financing is too 
expensive. In the following example, however, a special case is presented 
where the preferred dividend rate of state owned participation shares is 
adjusted to the market rate if the bank issues participation shares to private 
investors. This adjustment is big enough to offset the costs incurred through 
asymmetric information so that no underinvestment occurs. 
 If the bank issues participation certificates and subsequently incurs a 
loss, holders of certificates receive one third of the residual value. Banks set 
the preferred dividend PD so that investors can expect to break even: 
50% * (1/3) * (aworse + bworse - D) + 50% * (100 + PD) = 100. 
Under full information, good banks offer a preferred dividend of 21.67, bad 
banks of 60. If preferred dividends are not adjusted to the market rate, the 
following payoffs are realized at t=1: 
Type of bank Good Bad 
State of the 
economy 
Worsens Improves V Worsens Improves V 
Debt 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Participation 
Certificates 
(State) 
78.33 170 124.17 40 170 105 
Participation 
Certificates 
(Private) 
78.33 121.67 100 40 160 100 
Equity 78.33 228.33 153.33 40 105 72.50 
 
The expected value of their equity increases, so the good firm would invest. 
The bad firm would not invest, as the state’s preferred dividend is too high. 
If the state’s dividend is adjusted to market rates, both banks invest: 
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Type of bank Good Bad 
State of the 
economy 
Worsens Improves V Worsens Improves V 
Debt 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Participation 
Certificates 
(State) 78.33 121.67 100 40 160 100 
Participation 
Certificates 
(Private) 78.33 121.67 100 40 160 100 
Equity 78.33 276.67 177.50 40 115 77.50 
 
If only management is aware of the bank’s prospects, investors demand a 
preferred dividend equal to the average of both firms. Thus, in order to raise 
capital for the project, both firms have to offer a dividend of 50% * 21.67 + 
50% * 60 = 40.83. If the state’s preferred dividend is not readjusted, the 
following payoffs are realized: 
Type of bank Good Bad 
State of the 
economy 
Worsens Improves V Worsens Improves V 
Debt 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Participation 
Certificates 
(State) 78.33 170 124.17 40 170 105 
Participation 
Certificates 
(Private) 78.33 140.83 109.58 40 140.83 90.42 
Equity 78.33 209.17 143.75 40 124.17 82.08 
 
If the good bank were to issue and invest the bad bank would do so too: 
This would allow the bad bank to pay a preferred dividend of 40.83 instead 
of 60, increasing their shareholder’s expected value to 82.08. However, this 
would mean that good banks would have to pay a dividend of 40.83 instead 
of 21.67. Their equity holder’s expected value would decrease to 177.5, 
which is less than the 120 they would expect to earn by not investing at all. 
Thus, the good firm would pass up on the investment project. The bad bank 
would therefore also pass up, as issuing would identify them, which means 
that their shareholders value is decreased because of the premium they pay 
to the state. Neither firm invests, which means that both investment projects 
are passed up although they have a positive net present value. 
  45 
 Finally, if the state adjusts its preferred dividend to the market rates, 
the following payoffs are realized: 
Type of bank Good Bad 
State of the 
economy 
Worsens Improves V Worsens Improves V 
Debt 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Participation 
Certificates 
(State) 78.33 140.83 109.58 40 140.83 90.42 
Participation 
Certificates 
(Private) 78.33 140.83 109.58 40 140.83 90.42 
Equity 78.33 238.33 158.33 40 153.33 96.67 
 
Because the rates are readjusted, the good firm saves enough on the 
participation certificates issued to the state in order to make up for some of 
their adverse selection costs. Comparing the ex-ante firm value of a bank 
with and without adjusting preferred dividend rates, the total ex-ante net 
present value of the banks increases from 22.5 to 27.5, as no 
underinvestment occurs. 
 Of course, the loss in equity value due to asymmetric information is 
not resolved: New participation certificate holders of good banks still 
receive a preferred dividend that is higher than under full information, at the 
expense of old equity holders. Issuing participation certificates under 
asymmetric information is only costly if the bank ends up earning a profit 
that is higher than the amount required to pay the full information preferred 
dividend. The full cost is incurred when a profit is earned that is sufficient 
to cover the rate set by the market. Assuming that the firm either incurs a 
loss or makes a profit sufficient to pay the full preferred dividend (as it is 
assumed in our example), the ex-ante cash flow that is incurred by issuing 
participation certificates under asymmetric information is CFAS = pP * 
PCNEW * (PDFULL – PDM), where pP is the probability that sufficient profits 
are made, PCNEW is the total face value of issued participation certificates, 
PDM is the preferred dividend set by the market under asymmetric 
information and PDFULL is the rate set by the market under full information. 
Banks whose full information rate is below the market rate (“good banks”) 
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have a negative asymmetric information cash flow, while banks with a full 
information preferred dividend rate above the market rate have a positive 
cash flow due to asymmetric information. The discount is also only realized 
in states where the bank could have paid the pre-discount preferred 
dividend. Thus, the value of the discount is D = pP * PCSTATE * (PDSTATE – 
PDM), where PCSTATE is the face value of participation certificates sold to 
the state and PDSTATE is the preferred dividend rate promised to the rate 
without a discount.  
 Without a discount (and without alternative financing options), a 
firm would issue and invest only if NPV(b) + CFas > 0. With the provision 
for a discount in place, the bank issues and invests if NPV(b) + CFas > -D. 
As in Myers and Majluf’s original example, a project with a higher net 
present value obviously makes it more likely that the good firm issues and 
invests. Banks with a positive cash flow due to asymmetric information 
would also always want to invest. If the asymmetric information cash flow 
is negative, the issue and invest decision depends on the size of the negative 
cash flow as well as the size of the discount: The size of the negative cash 
flow obviously increases with the size of the issue (PCNEW). It also increases 
with a decreasing full information preferred dividend rate, i.e. banks with a 
lower downside potential incur higher adverse selection costs.  The discount 
on the other hand increases with the amount of participation certificates 
previously issued to the state. The other factors, i.e. the preferred dividend 
rate set by the state, the dividend rate set on the market, and the probability 
that sufficient profits are made to cover all preferred dividends are the same 
for all banks and therefore do not influence the set of banks who do issue 
and invest. Thus, the provision that allows adjusting preferred dividend rates 
is more likely to change the issue decision for banks that a) have a high 
downside potential (but not the highest, as they would issue anyway) and b) 
already hold relatively high amounts of participation capital issued by the 
state. All in all, it can be expected that the provision will avoid some 
underinvestment, thus increasing the ex-ante firm value of banks. 
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5 Conclusion 
The financial crisis had negative effects on the equity ratio of Austrian 
banks, which forced them take participation capital from the state under the 
terms of the Austrian stabilization scheme for the financial markets. The 
terms of this stabilization scheme granted a discount on the preferred 
dividend rate on participation certificates if the banks subsequently raised 
additional participation capital from private parties. However, as Myers and 
Majluf showed, issuing equity (and similar securities) yields an adverse 
selection cost that might be higher than the return on the investment that is 
supposed to be financed with the proceeds of the issue: the project is passed 
up and the ex-ante firm value is reduced due to asymmetric information. A 
simple numerical example demonstrated how the discount on capital 
provided by the state might diminish this underinvestment problem. Thus, 
not only the worst banks with investment projects can be expected to invest; 
also better ones might do so, as the adjusted dividend rate allows them to 
raise capital profitably. More investment projects will be undertaken, which 
increases the ex-ante value of banks.  
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6 Zusammenfassung auf Deutsch 
Seit 2007 dauert eine schwerwiegende Finanzkrise an; deshalb hat die 
österreichische Bundesregierung im Oktober 2008 ein Maßnahmenpaket 
beschlossen, welches die Stabilität des österreichischen Finanzmarktes 
gewährleisten soll. Eines der hierfür erdachten Instrumente ist die direkte 
Zuführung staatlicher Gelder an Banken, um deren Eigenkapitalquote zu 
erhöhen und Liquiditätsengpässe zu verhindern. Diese Eigenmittel werden 
in Form von Partizipationskapital zugeführt, welches durch eine 
Vorzugsdividende abgegolten wird. Diese Vorzugsdividende wurde von der 
Europäischen Kommission mit mindestens 9,3% p.a. festgelegt, da eine 
niedrigere Dividende den Wettbewerb beeinträchtigen würde. Allerdings 
bietet eine der Bestimmungen die Möglichkeit die Dividende zu verringern, 
wenn dreißig Prozent der neu aufgenommenen Mittel zu gleichen 
Konditionen vom Markt bereitgestellt werden – in diesem Fall wird die 
Marktrate auch für die Abgeltung staatlichen Kapitals herangezogen. 
 Wie Myers und Majluf (1984) erklären, ist der Verkauf von 
Anteilsscheinen (und ähnlichen Finanzinstrumenten, wie z.B. 
Partizipationsscheinen) für manche Unternehmen jedoch sehr kostspielig, da 
asymmetrische Informationsverteilung adverse Selektionskosten verursacht. 
Diese Kosten können so hoch sein, dass Unternehmen sogar auf neue 
Eigenmittel verzichten, obwohl sie dadurch auch auf profitable 
Investitionen verzichten müssen. Da Banken allerdings günstigeres 
Staatskapital bekommen, wenn sie Partizipationsscheine an  private 
Verkaufen, kann es passieren, dass dieser Rabatt die adversen 
Selektionskosten aufwiegt.  
 Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, das Zusammenspiel dieser beiden Faktoren 
zu analysieren. Im ersten Teil wird Myers und Majlufs „Pecking Order 
Theory“ der Kapitalstruktur erörtert, welche sich mit Anteilsschein-
Verkäufen im Zusammenhang mit asymmetrischer Informationsverteilung 
befasst. Empirische Arbeiten sowie Erweiterungen des ursprünglichen 
Modells werden ebenfalls vorgestellt. Der zweite Teil befasst sich mit der 
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Entstehung des Bankenhilfspakets und seinen Bestimmungen. Der dritte 
Teil bietet ein Zahlenbeispiel, das die Auswirkungen relevanter 
Bestimmungen des Hilfspakets in Hinblick auf adverse Selektionskosten 
illustriert. 
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